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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.AHC1H DAl\I ( 1 f)~STRL'CTORS, 
P ctit i o~Jl er. 
-vs.-
~·rl\:\TE T.AX CO~I l\IISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent 
Case 
No. 9384 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
ST ~ \ TE:\IEN"T OF FACTS 
The petitioner ,s statement of the nature of the case 
and of the facts inYolved therein is in all particulars 
accurate. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE ACCESS ROAD IS A "HIGHWAY" WITHIN 
THE PURVIEW OF 41-1-1(bb), UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953. 
(a) THE ACCESS ROAD IS OPEN TO THE 
PUBLIC AS A MATTER OF RIGHT FOR 
PURPOSES OF VEHICULAR TRAFFIC. 
(b) IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE 
STATE OF UTAH HAVE A DUTY TO 
MAINTAIN THE ACCESS ROAD, NOR 
THAT THE ACCESS ROAD BE DEDI-
CATED OR ABANDONED TO THE PUB-
LIC, IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE A "HIGH-
WAY" WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 
41-1-1(bb), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
PoiNT II. 
THE MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION AND 
LICENSING REQUIREMENT AS PROVIDED 
FOR IN 41-1-1, ET SEQ., UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, IS AN EXERCISE OF THE STATE 
POLICE POWER, AND AS SUCH, PROPERLY 
EXTENDS TO ANY VEHICLES USING THE 
ACCESS ROAD WHICH ARE NOT EXEMPT 
UNDER 41-1-19, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
PoiNT III 
THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF 
TAXING STATUTES IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
THIS CASE. 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J>oiXT I. 
THE ACCESS ROAD IS A "JIIGI-IWA"'"{·'' \VITI-Ill'J 
THE PURVIEW OF 41-1-l(bb), UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953. 
r1_1he }pgi8la tnre is free to attach to a ""Ord the IDPall-
ing it rhoosc·s (:-,o .Am. Jur. ~()1 "Statutes''). \Y.hen it 
<.lPfines a term, that < lPfinition is controlling (50 .Am. J ur. 
~G2, "Statutes,). In -!1-1-1(bb), Utah Code Annotated, 
1933, a high\\·a~r is defiued as the entire "·idth bet\YC('ll 
property lines of e\·ery \\~ay or place of "·hatrver nature 
"·heu auy part tlH?reof is open to the public as a matter of 
right for purposes of vehicular traffic. As a result, \Ye 
are not concerned with Hornhfwk definitions of the word 
''highway," Am. Jur. definitions of the \vord "high\\·ay'' 
or the Ballantine Law Dictionary definition of the \Yord 
'' high\vay. '' The \\"Ord ''highway'' is defined four times 
in the Motor V chic1e Act, t\vice under Revenue and Reg-
istration Sections, 41-1-l(bb) and 41-11-49(c), and t\viee 
under the Traffic Regulations and Drivers License Sec-
tions, 41-6-7 (a) and 41-2-1 ( i). The definitions are not 
identical. The terms "high,vay'' and "road\\"ay" '"hen 
used in an act are used for special purposes of that act, 
and sections of other acts, codes and decisions under 
them relating to those terms haYe little bearing on the 
meaning of the terms as used in the \Tehicle Code. B1a1t-
ton v. Curry, (('ialif.) 121 P. 2d 125, affirmed and supple-
mented 129 P. 2d 1, 20 Cal. 2d 793 (1942); 1 Am. Jur. 9: 
34 ALR 1250. 11 hc cl<.}finitions expressly given in our 
statutes "·ith reference to roads, highways, etc., \Yere for 
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the purpose of so defining in order to fix the duties and 
responsibilities of local officers and authorities with re-
spect to their right to supervise and control the roads. 
Blarnlon v. Curry, 121 P. 2d 125, affirmed and supple-
mented 129 P. 2d 1, 20 Cal. 2d 23; P. U. C. v. Jones, 179 
Pac. 745, (1919). 
Appellant cites Jackson v. James, (97 Ut. 41), to 
illustrate that the word "high,Yay" in 41-1-1(bb) in 
fact means "public highway." However, we submit that 
the Court did not, in fact, speak to that point but merely 
referred to it in passing, and, therefore, that the pres-
ent Utah Court should not give such an interpretation a 
great deal of weight. Even if it is the case that the 
terms are in this instance equ~ta ble, \Ye contend that 
the definition in 41-1-1 (bb) is still controlling. 
(a) THE ACCESS ROAD IS OPEN TO THE 
PUBLIC AS A MATTER OF RIGHT FOR 
PURPOSES OF VEHICULAR TRAFFIC. 
"41-1-1(bb). 'STREET oR HIGH\YAY.' The entire 
width bet,Yeen property lines of eYery way or 
place of "Thatever nature \Yhen any part thereof 
is open to the public, as a matter of right, for pur-
poses of vehicular traffic.'' 
..._t\.ppellant argues that if, and only if, the general 
public uses the access road as a matter of legal right 
against the owner of the road can that road properly be 
considered a '' high\Yay'' \Yithin the purview of 
41-1-1 (bb ), Utah CodeAnnotated, 1953. \\"'" e contend that 
the word ''right'' need not and should not be limited to 
sueh an extent. The \Yord ''right'' is broad enough to in-
clude 'vhatever may be la,yfully claimed. Bankers Houle 
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Bldg. & Loan ~l.~·s·'u v. JJr,l;att, 162 S.W. 2d 139, 694 Texas 
173; l.JOIIaS Y. ~'-,'fat(', 50 rreun. 287; (:". /···t. Fidelity & Guar-
aufy C'n. Y. Borou.q/1 Bunk of Brool,'lyu, 146 X.Y.S. 870, 
161 Appellant Div. 479. 
Appellant's recitation of statutes relati Ye to the 
acquisition of property rights or rights of use as against 
thl} federal government is of no concern in this case. It 
is true that the access road 'Yas not officially dedicated 
to public use or abandoned to public use, but the federal 
government itself has given the public a legally enforce-
able claim against appellant by the terms of Paragraph 
48 of the contract between the Arch Dam Constructors 
and the United States of America. Certain people not 
parties to a valid contract may have enforceable rights as 
third party beneficiaries to the agreement, if the contract 
evidences the intention to confer some direct benefit on 
a third party. Hamill v. Md. Casua.Zty Co. 209 F. 2d 338, 
lOth Circuit ( 1954). No distinction has been made when 
the promisee is a governmental body. Governmental im-
munity to suit is not extended to the promisor who has 
undertaken a duty by contract. Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal. 
App. 2d 279, 272 P. 2d 82 (1954 Cert. Denied 348 U. S. 
916 (1955 ). 
It is not material that the access road will be inun-
dated at some future time. We are only concerned 'vith 
the status of the road at present. If the public uses it as 
a matter of right at the present time, it is of no con-
cern that it may not have that right at sometime in the 
future. 
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It is consistent with reason that the legislature should 
have intended the construction \Ve urge for the word 
"highway." The term was undoubtedly used in a sense 
as broad as the mischief to be guarded against, \vhich is 
just as significant as to the access road as to a dedicated 
road, as the public freely travels upon both. The regu-
lation and supervision of Yehicles, their movement and 
control, their identity in relation to the public, and any 
resultant damage that they may occasion, is as necessary 
on the access road as on a dedicated thoroughfare. Hots-
lund et al v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, 
153 N.Y. S. 4d 519, 185 F. 2d 188 (1951); Dorsey et al v. 
Babba et al, 240 P. 2d 604 (195:2); 1 ... \m. Jur. 81. 
(b) IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE 
STATE OF UTAH HAVE A DUTY TO 
MAINTAIN TI-IE ACCESS ROAD, NOR 
TI-IAT THE ACCESS ROAD BE DEDI-
CATED OR ABANDONED TO THE PUB-
LIC, IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE A "HIGH-
WAY" WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 
41-1-1(bb), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 . 
... \ ppellant argues that in order for the access road to 
be considered a higlr\vay, it must be dedicated to the pub-
lic, or abandoned to the public, and that the public must 
have a duty to maintain it. X o mention is made in the 
definition as set out by the legislature of a duty of public 
maintenance, or of a specific method of acquiring the 
right of use. Appellant seems to contend that the legis-
lature must have intended ~nch and that \Ye must imply 
such because of the very nature of public \Yays. Ho,veYer, 
the g()neral la\Y is not in accord \Yith that position. 
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If a 'vay is one over \vhich the public have a general 
right of passage, it is in legal contemplation a high,vay, 
\vhether it be one owned by a private corporation or one 
o\rued by the government or a governmental corporation. 
rrhe mode of its creation does not of itself invariably 
dPtermiue its character, for this in general is determined 
by the rights which the public have in it. 13 R.C.L., pg. 
17, para. 5; Roads and Streets, Vol. I, by Elliott; Spindler 
v. Toootey (Indiana, 1953), 111 N.E. 2d 715, 111 N.E. 
~)d -1-
...J ' J. 
rrhe term ''public highway'' in the broad, ordinary 
sense covers every common way for travel by persons on 
foot or 'vith vehicles used on high,vays which the public 
has the right to use either conditionally or uncondition-
ally, and this may include turnpikes and tollroads, lanes, 
erossroads, and even railroad and platform approaches 
thereto '\Then appearing in a general law. P. U. C. of Utah 
v. Joucs, 179 Pac. 745 (1919). The term "public high-
"·ay'' in a general law should be regarded as having been 
used by the legislature in its general sense unless there 
is some efficient reason for believing it \vas used in the 
limited ~ense. P. U. C. of Utah v. Jollcs, 179 Pac. 745 
(1919); West 652; Weirich v. State, 121 N.W. 652. 
The Court in Commonzcealth v. Ga1nmons, 23 Pick. 
201, cited in Crossler v. Safeway Stores, 6 P. 2d 152, in 
discussing police powers and high,vay regulations said: 
''The single question presented here is \vhethcr the 
place \vhere the complainant and defendant met at 
the time of the collision \Vas a road \vi thin the mean-
ing of the statute. It appears that the place in 
question had not been laid out, either as a high,vay 
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or as a townway, and that the public had no right 
in it except hy sufferance of the O\Yners .... The 
term 'road' is not necessarily limited to a publir 
\Yay, and there is nothing in the reason or purposes 
of that law for which such a limitation can be 
implied. The object of the la-\Y is to prescribe a 
rule of conduct for the convenience PHd safetv of 
those who may have occasion to travel, ·and 
actually travel ... on a place adapted to and fittc1l 
for travel and actually used for that purpose by a 
public laying out or by the dedication of the 
owners or the actual permission and license of the 
owners for the time being . . . The same reason 
applies to private roads actually used as to public 
roads, that is, roads to which the public has a per-
manent right by laying out, by prescription or by 
dedication.'' 
The C~ourt also said that the owners may close the gates 
if they see fit, but \Yhen in fact they are open, the police 
powers of the state extend to them. 
Both the Weirich and Gammans cases involved the 
regulation of traffic. Neither involves a statute defining 
''public highway'' or ''highway.'' A fortiori, the same 
reasoning \Yould apply to the instant case \Yhich involves 
motor vehicle control under the police po\Yer and a statute 
\vhich sets forth a broad, general definition of ''highway.'' 
The tollroad in the cited case \Yas privately owned and 
supported by a turnpike corporation, and the la"T of the 
state proYided that upon the abandonment of a tollroad by 
its owner it would be deemed a "public high''Tay" for 
the purposes of a particular statute, but the court held 
that until then it \Yas still a "public highway" for motor 
vehicle rrgnla tion purposes, due to the \Yell kno\vn need 
for regulation of the operations of motor vehicles under 
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the police po\ver. The court tended to broaden rather 
than l'l)st riet the term "publie high\\·ay', so as to include 
all \\'ays used by the public for public travel. They said 
that t hP manifest purpose of the la\v was to protect 
traYclers. It is just as important to afford such protec-
tion on tollroads as on ordinary public highways; there 
is no difference \vha.tever; the term ''public high,va.y'' \vas 
used in a sense as broad as the mischief to be guarded 
against, which \Vas just as significant as to tollroads as 
ordinary highways. 
A general law regulating the operating of automo-
biles upon public highways in the interest of public safety 
rather suggests the use of the term "public highway" in 
the general than the pa rticula.r sense, since the danger 
of personal injury is quite as great and immunity there-
from is quite as important as to travelers on the one as 
on the other. lT1 eirich v. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 N.W. 652, 
~~ I-l. R . ..:\. (N.S. 1221, 17 Ann. Cas. 802. 
PoiNT II. 
THE MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION AND 
LICENSING REQUIREMENT AS PROVIDED 
FOR IN 41-1-1, ET SEQ., UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, IS AN EXERCISE OF THE STATE 
POLICE POWER, AND AS SUCH, PROPERLY 
EXTENDS TO ANY VEHICLES USING THE 
ACCESS ROAD WHICH ARE NOT EXEMPT 
UNDER 41-1-19, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The matter is well settled that the use of highways 
and streets as public \vays for the use of vehicles and 
pedestrians may be limited, controlled and regulated by 
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the public authority in the exercise of the police power, 
'vhenever and to the extent necessary to proYide for and 
promote the safety, peace, health, morals and general 
\\Telfare of the people. ( 5A Am. J ur. 5 "Automobiles 
and High "'H y Traffic" and collected cases ; C 1 a rh Y. 
Poor, 274 lT. S. 354, 71 L. Ed. 1199, 47 S. Ct. 702. That 
use is subject to such reasonable and impartial regula-
tions adopted pursuant to this po,ver as are calculated 
to secure to the general public the greatest practical 
benefits from the right of use and to provide for their 
safety in the enjoyment of such rights. (5A Am. Jur. 5, 
"Automobiles and High''Tay Traffic" and collected cases; 
C1 arl; v. Poor, 27 4 1T.S. 5;)4, 71 L. Ed. 1199, 47 S. St. 702). 
In exercising that power, the legislature of each state 
can require the licensing of every motor vehicle operated 
within its boundaries ( 5 Am. J ur. 93, ''Automobiles,'' and 
collected cases; Christy Y. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 K.E. 
1055, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 215, 108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 3 Ann. 
Cas. 487; 5 Am. J ur. 93, ''Automobiles'' and collected 
cases.) 
The prime intent of motor vehicle registration and 
1 ieensing lR\YS in general is to superYise vehicles, their 
movement and control, their identity in relation to the 
public, and an~; resultant damage or injuries that they 
ma~T occasion. H ofslund et al 1:. JJJ etropolitan Casualty 
Ins. Co. of Nr>n' I~ork, 153 N.Y.S. 2d 519, 185 F. 2d 188 
(1!1;)1) ; State Y. Jl a yo, 106 Me. 62, 75 A. 295, 26 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 502, 20 Ann. Cas. 512: 5 Am. Jur. 91, "Automo-
biles,'' anrl collected cases. In this "Tay proper state su-
perYisory authority may be invoked "Then the need there-
10 
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for is pre~ent, and the state may verify the o\vner of the 
\·ehiele in the ('ase of violation of the la'v or of accident. 
llofslund et al v. Jletropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New 
r ork, 153 N. 1r. s. 2d 519, 185 F. 2d 188 (1951); State Y. 
J/ ayo, 106 l\Ie. 62, 75 A. 295, 26 L. R. A. (~. S. 502, 20 
Ann. ('1as. 51~; 3 .1\m. Jur. 91, " .. A.utomobiles," and col-
lect cd cases. 
Since a state's re~istration requirements are primar-
ily for the enforcement of good order and the protection 
of those within its jurisdiction, it is logical that if the 
public is free to use a road, an act that is to provide for 
public safety and order in motor vehicle operations \vould 
~urcly extend in its coverage to vehicles using the road. 
C an~as Stage, Inc. v. K ozer, 104 Ore. 600; 209 P. 95 ( 1922) . 
. As a result, it has been held that registration require-
ments may be applicable to roads and streets not public 
higlnvays if they are used for travel by the public. Cross-
ler \y. 8afeway Stores, 51 Idaho 413, 6 P. 2d 151, 80 A.L.R. 
4:63; 5 .• A. Am. Jur., "Automobiles and Highway Traffic," 
and collected cases. For instance, it has been held that 
such an act extends to a privately owned and operated 
toll road 'vi thin the corporate limits of a village. Weirich 
v. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 N.W. 652, 22 L.R.A. (N.S. 1221, 
17 ..:\nn. Cas. 802. 
There seems to be little question a bout the power of 
the state to license and register the motor vehicles \vhich 
travel upon the access road. The only question, then, is 
'vhether or not the state intended to do so. To ans,ver 
that question, we must look at the statutes and the cases 
construing those statutes, as the licensing and registra-
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tion of motor vehicles is controlled by state. ( 5A Am. J ur. 
80, "Automobiles and High,vay Traffic.") 
"41-1-19. Every motor vehicle, combination of ve-
hicles, trailer, and semitrailer "Then driven or 
moved upon a high\\"'ay shall be subjeet to the reg-
istration and certificate of title pro, .. isions of thi~ 
act : . . . '' 
The Utah ~lotor \T ehicle Registration Aet is a police 
measure, and its purpose is the regulation of motor ve-
hicles for public safety; for anti-theft control; for the 
control of traffic violations; and for identification pur-
poses. Ca.rter Oil Co. v. State Tax Comnz., 98 Ut. 96, 96 
P. 2d 727 (1939). 
Appellant appears to have confused our statute \Yith 
a strictly revenue measure. The purpose of our Act is 
not revenue. Carter Oil Co .. v State Tax Comnz., 98 Ut. 
96; 96 P. 2d 727, (1939). The fact that revenue is inci-
dentally derived does not invalidate a law as a police 
regulation. (5 Am. Jur. 128, "Automobiles," 5 A. L. R. 
764.) Even a requirement imposed primarily under the 
police po\ver may have the secondary purpose of revenue 
and still be a police measure. Carley & Hanzilton v. Snook, 
281 U.S. 66, 7 4 L. Ed. 704, 50 S. St. 204, 68 A. L. R. 194; 
5 A Am. Jur. 86, "Automobiles and High,, .. ay Traffic," 
and collected cases. 
That some of the money goes toward road mainte-
nance is not fatal. The Cartet· v. State Taa; Comnzission 
case, cited above, is authority for the proposition that 
tlH\ automobile registration statute was nonetheless regu-
12 
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latory though a part of the registration fees \vas allo-
eated to the State High\\~ay Fund. 
rrhe goYernment indicated that in the peak of COn-
struction there \Yould be a considerable volume of traffic 
over the road aside from construction activities; that a 
high school bus \Vould operate between Dutch John and 
~Lanila daily; and that the road constitutes a connecting 
link between ~I anila and Vernal; so that obviously traffic 
la\v enforcement would be necessary for accident preven-
tion as a protection to the public safety. (See Appeal of 
,l..,'fur.qe, 57 Lac. Jur. 49.) 
rrhe lTnited States does not exercise police powers 
in traffic matters, or for that matter, in the enforcement 
of any localla\v. United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 
41, 19 L. Ed. 593; 5 Am. Jur. 15, "Automobiles." This 
i~ left to the state and counties in the area. In recogni-
tion of that fact, a request was made by the federal gov-
ernment that the State Highway Patrol take jurisdiction 
for the administration of the enforcement of the state 
high,vay la\\·s and regulations, which jurisdiction has been 
accepted. Superintendent Hyatt of the Highway Patrol 
has appointed patrolmen to be placed in the area. The 
High,vay Patrol is charged with the responsibility of 
regulating traffic. The contract does not specifically 
~tate that the .. A.rrh Dam Constructors are to comply with 
licensing and registration requirements of the State of 
Utah, but such is necessary by force of the lltah statutes 
a8 a proper exercise of the state police po,vers, and even 
if this \vere not automatically the case, the acceptance 
of j urisdirtion \vould accomplish the same end. Appellant 
13 
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fails to recognize that the Registration Act IS merely 
another facet of the state police power. 
PoiNT III 
THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF 
TAXING STATUTES IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
THIS CASE. 
The Utah motor vehicle registration requirement is a 
police measure, not a taxing statute. Carter Oil Co. Y. 
State Ta.x Comm., 98 Ut. 96, 96 P. 2d 727 (1939). Hence, 
the rule of strict construction of taxing statutes does not 
apply to it nor to this case. It is true that the state under 
the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Registration Art in-
cidentally acquires reYenue. Arguendo, if this is sufficient 
to bring the rule of strict construction into play, we sub-
mit that without regard to whether tax statutes should 
receive a strict or liberal construction it is elementary 
that they should receive a fair and reasonable construc-
tion to effect the end for which they were intended. (Cool-
ey, Taxation, 4th Ed., (1924), Vol. 2, Section. 505.) Rev-
enue law·s are not to be construed from the standpoint of 
the ta:xpayer alone nor of the government alone. (Cooley, 
Taxation, 4th Ed., (1924), Volume 2, Section 505.) The 
g·oyernmPnt in its tax legislation is not assuming a hostile 
position to\vnrd the citizen but is apportioning for and 
as the agent of all a duty among them. (Cooley, Taxar 
lion, 4th Ed., ( 1924), 'r ol. 2, Section 505.) There can be 
no propriety in construing such a la\Y, either "~ith ex-
ceptional favor beyond that accorded to other general 
law·s. The construction "~ithout bias or prejudice should 
14 
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sel\k the real intent of the law. ( ( 1oole,tJ, Taxa.tiou, 4th 
J1~d. ( 1924), Vol. 2, Section 505.) In addition, the con-
struction given a statute by those \Yho have the duty of 
executing it is always entitled to the most respectful 
eonsideration and ought not to he overruled \Yithout 
<'Ogt~nt reasons. ill cK end rick v. State Tax Commission, 
9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P. 2d 177 (1959). 
CONCLUSION 
The police powers of the state of Utah, one of vvhich 
is the motor vehicle registration requirement as set out 
in -1-1-1-1 et seq., properly extend to the access road. 
-t-1-1-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, makes it un-
la\vful for any person to drive or move, or for an owner 
kno\vingly to permit to be driven or moved upon any 
higlnvay, any vehicle of a type required to be registered 
thereunder which is not registered. It is not questioned 
that the vehicles involved herein are of such a type. 
-!1-1-1 (bb) defines a highway as the entire width bet,veen 
property lines of every way or place of whatever nature 
\vhen any part thereof is open to the public as a matter of 
right for purposes of vehicular traffic. The federal gov-
ernment, by contract, has given the public a right to the 
use of the access road. (Paragraph 48 of the General 
Provisions and Specifications of the Contract bet\Yeen 
the ~\rch Dam Constructors and the Bureau of Reclama-
tion.) Therefore, it is a highway 'vithin the meaning of 
-!1-1-1 (bb ), and the vehicles in question are subject to the 
registration la\\Ts of the state of Utah. 
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The rule of strict construction of taxing statutes is 
not applicable to this Act, nor to this case; but to the con-
trary, the construction given these statutes by the Tax 
Commission should be given the utmost consideration. 
It is respectfully submitted that the registration fees 
imposed upon appellant should be held valid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BlTDG E 
Attorney General 
NORMAN S. JOHNSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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